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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

TITANIUM M E T A L S CORPORATION OF AMERICA, a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No.

vs.
SPACE METALS, INC., a corporation,
and VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

13474

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is a suit by the plaintiff-respondent againts the
defendant-appellant Bank in contract on a letter of credit.
DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT
The matter was tried before the Third Judicial District Court, sitting without a jury. The Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson rendered a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, Titanium Metals Corporation of America, and
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against appellant, for the sum of $54,132.72 and costs of
$22.00. The court found as a matter of fact and law that
defendant Valley Bank and Trust Company, had obligated
itself under a letter of credit and had waived certain conditions thereof.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant, Valley Bank and Trust Company seeks reversal of the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The essential facts are neither complicated nor disputed. The plaintiff, Titanium Metals Corporation of
America, sold merchandise to the defendant, Space Metals, Inc. Space Metals, Inc. requested the appellant, Valley Bank and Trust Company, to furnish it with Letters
of Credit or Guarantee. Three critical letters of either
guaranty or credit were issued by Valley Bank and Trust
Company, hereinafter referred to as "Bank" to Titanium
Metals Corporation of America, hereinafter referred to as
"Titanium".
The first letter guaranteed the payment of invoices
(R. 37). All invoices submitted by Titanium to Bank
were paid (R. 34).
The terms of the second letter, committing the Bank's
credit differed from the terms of the first letter. This
letter was issued by the Bank on October 8th, 1968, and
the critical language is:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
" . . . to pay all of your collection drafts upon presentation or due date until December 31st, 1968
(R. 38)." (Emphasis added.)
Titanium continued to send invoices. These invoices
were presented by the Bank to Space Metals, Inc., its
customer, who from time to time purchased cashier checks
from Bank and Bank mailed the cashier checks to Titanium. All of the invoices that were furnished to Space
Metals, Inc. by Bank during the period of the second
letter were paid by Space Metals, Inc. to Titanium (R.
34 and R. 165).
The original of each invoice was sent to Space Metals,
Inc. and only a copy was sent to Bank (R. 35).
The Bank advised the customer of receipt of an invoice and in each case, where an invoice was paid, Space
Metals, Inc. arranged for the funding of the invoice, purchased a cashier check and paid the same. (Testimony
of Griff Williams, President of Space Metals, Inc. R. 182.)
The Bank never paid for an invoice (Bank Officer
R. 168, Space Metals Officer R. 182).
On March 3rd, 1969, the third letter was issued by
Bank and it stated as follows:
"We have agreed . . . to pay all of your collection
drafts upon presentation or due date for a period
of ninety days . . ." (R. 39, P. 3). (Emphasis
added.)
Thereafter merchandise, accompanied by invoices, was
shipped by Titanium to the defendant, Space Metals, Inc.
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4
Copies of the invoices relating to the said shipments
(seven shipments were covered) were mailed to, and received by appellant, Bank. The first invoice was paid by
Space Metals, Inc., the remaining six invoices were returned, without payment (R. 35, 36).
None of the invoices was accompanied by a collection
draft or collection drafts, nor were any drafts with respect thereto furnished to appellant at any other time (R.
35).
Valley Bank and Trust Company did not receive any
drafts from Titanium (R. 166, R. 200). The Bank cashier
testified that if the draft had been received, "We would
have paid the draft and notified the customer" (R. 200).
Titanium knew what a draft was and used them regularly in its business:
"Well, we do use the drafts in our business. A
draft is a check drawn on a customer — drawn
by us which the bank accepts and remits" (R.
148). (Testimony of Titanium Credit Manager.)
Titanium did not issue or furnish to Bank any drafts
at any time (R. 35).
Appellant transmitted to the plaintiff written advices
to the effect that "we return herewith unpaid." These
advices were returned attached to the invoice copies.
There is no evidence of any change or amendment to the
letter of credit. The pleadings raised no question of waiver
and it would appear that the theory of waiver was first
considered by the court during the course of trial.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE APPELLANT, VALLEY BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, WAIVED THE
TERMS OF THE LETTER OF CREDIT BECAUSE WAIVER WAS NOT PLED.
It appears clear from the findings of fact, that the
trial court's decision was based on a finding of fact (No.
6) and a conclusion of law (No. 3) that the defendant,
Valley Bank and Trust Company, waived the requirement
of collection drafts (R. 106). Therefore, the issue is,
whether or not, as a matter of law and fact, a waiver was
established.
The plaintiff, Titanium Metals Corporation, did not
plead waiver. The general rule supported by a preponderance of courts, is that a waiver must be pleaded specially.
This is the rule unless there is no opportunity to plead
waiver.
The general rule is set forth in Commercial Standard
Insurance Co. v. Remay, 58 Idaho 302, 72 P. 2d 859, where
the court found that, when waiver is not pled specially,
evidence is inadmissible to prove it. The Court is also
precluded from considering or taking notice thereof under
the majority rule. In Rudd v. Rogerson, 424 P. 2d 776
(Colorado, 1967), the court also considered the problem
of pleading waiver. The court stated:
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"A waiver of an asserted right must be affirmatively pleaded if it is to be used as a defense."
The Rudd case involved an action by buyer to rescind
a contract for the purchase of cattle from defendant on
the grounds of breach of warranty by defendant. The
court found that there had been no waiver of the right
to rescind, shown by the plaintiff's conduct, and that even
if a showing had been made that his conduct amounted
to waiver, the question of waiver of that right was not
placed in issue by the pleadings. The Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 8(c), sets out the statutory law on pleading
of waiver:
"In pleading . . . a party shall set forth affirmaaffirmatively . . . waiver, and any other matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense,"
R. C.P.Utah 8(c).
Thus, the trial court erred in considering evidence of
waiver since plaintiff clearly did not plead waiver.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT APPELLANT WAIVED THE TERMS
OF THE LETTER OF CREDIT, BECAUSE
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THIS FINDING.
The plaintiff had the burden of proof with respect
to waiver, since the general rule is that the party seeking
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to establish waiver must prove the facts on which he relies. Plaintiff did not meet this burden.
The general rule is that waiver of an agreement or
condition thereof cannot be found unless the evidence
shows knowledge of the rights involved and a clear intention to waive them. This general rule was stated by the
Utah Supreme Court in 1936, in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath,
et a/., 90 Utah 187, 61 P. 2d 308, in which the court said:
"A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right . . . To constitute a waiver, there
must be an existing right, benefit, or advantage,
a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to
relinquish it. It must be distinctly made . . ."
The facts in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, were similar
to the facts in the present case. In the Phoenix case, the
defendants, agents of plaintiff insurance company, were
told by plaintiff to reduce the amount of a policy they
had issued covering a certain building. The insurance
company's instructions to its agents made it clear that
agents were under an obligation to cancel promptly when
told to do so or they would render themselves personally
liable to the company for any loss. The defendants wrote
to the plaintiff asking plantiff to reconsider the reduction.
The plaintiff responded by letter that their original order
stood. However, the insured building was destroyed before plaintiff's letter was received by the defendants. Defendants contended that the plaintiff's delayed letter,
responding to their request, for reconsideration constituted
a waiver of its demand. The Court found, as discussed

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
above, that no waiver was established since plaintiffs did
not intend to relinquish their right. There was nothing
in the plaintiff's letter itself or in the act of sending a
letter to indicate an intent to waive the right of insisting
upon agent's compliance.
In the present case the Bank had a right just as the
Phoenix Ins, Co. did. Its right to a draft established by
the terms of the Letter of Credit could not be waived with
any less of a showing of clear intent to waive than in
Phoenix. Bank made payment to Titanium under the first
letter of guarantee dated, May 28, 1968, which letter required only that an invoice be presented.
The Bank manager testified:
"Q. Okay. Now, r e f e r r i n g to Exhibit 1-P,
did you receive invoices?
"A. Yes, sir,,
"Q. And were they paid.
"A. Yes, sir.,
*

•

*

"Q. And what was the line of credit?
,. "A. The line of credit was that we would
approve invoices payable up to a maximum of
$15,000 for definite purposes stated" (R. 165).
Bank made no payments when the second and third
letters were in effect. All payments that were received
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by Titanium was as a result of cashier checks purchased
by Space Metals, Inc. and Space Metals, Inc. in each case
was listed on the cashier check as "Purchaser".
Mr. Williams, Space Metals President, stated:
"Oh, took a company check, and as soon as the
funds were available in the Bank, and then purchased the cashier checks, and the bank sent it
on to Titanium Metals. (R. 184, R. 45, 47, 48
and Exhibitl3-B.)
Bank made no payments when the second and third
letters of credit were in effect. Farrel Anderson, Bank
Officer, testified:
"Q. Do you know of any case where the
bank advanced a specific amount to pay an invoice? That is after your agreement?
"A. No, sir" (R. 168).
These second and third Letters of Credit specifically
required presentation of a collection "draft" before payment would be made. There was no manifestation of a
distinct intention to relinquish this right. The act of payment by Valley Bank and Trust Company under the first
letter of credit, really has no relation to the second and
third letters of credit. The payment to Titanium made
by appellant under the different terms of the first Letter
of Guarantee can certainly not be deemed a valid waiver
of different rights under the second and third Letters of
Credit. According to the test of waiver established in
Phoenix, the bank would have had to intend this act to
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relinquish the right to a draft, and this was clearly not
the case. In the first instance a draft was not required
(as it was in all subsequent cases covered by the second
and third Letters of Credit).
There is no evidence to support a finding of waiver.
Waiver must be clearly proved. It cannot be inferred by
the court. The evidence in the record does not disclose
any waiver at all.
POINT III.
A LETTER OF CREDIT, BEING A LETTER
OF GUARANTY, MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED, WITH EFFECT GIVEN TO THE
CONDITIONS WHICH THE PARTY TO BE
CHARGED HAS SPECIFIED.
The Letters of Credit dated October 8, 1968, and
March 3, 1969, agree to make payments upon presentation of "collection drafts" (R. 38 and 39). The parties
have stipulated that no drafts were ever sent to Valley
Bank and Trust Co. by Titanium (R. 35). This requirement of draft presentation is an essential requirement of
the Letter of Credit. The statutory law requires that
there be adherence to the essential terms of a Letter of
Credit. The rule is described in "Uniform Laws Annotated", a West Publishing Company consolidation of the
various Uniform Commercial Codes. The rule stated is,
"(1) Generally — essential requirements of a letter of
credit must be strictly complied with." (§ 5-104 Note 1;
§ 5-103 Note 1.)
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The case law also supports the proposition that a
bank is not liable under a Letter of Credit unless there
is strict compliance with the specific terms appearing on
the face of the Letter of Credit. In North American Manufacturer's Export Assoc, Inc. v. Chase National Bank
of City of New York, 77 F. Supp. 55 (1948), a fact situation not unlike the present one was involved. The bank
in the North America Mfrs. Export case, stood in no contractual relationship with the plaintiff except as expressed
in a letter of credit. The court, Judge Medina, held that
the Letter of Credit controlled as to both parties' obligations and that plaintiff had failed to meet its requirements The court stated the rule with great clarity,
" . . . A bank which issues a Letter of Credit is
liable to the person in whose favor the credit is
issued only upon strict compliance with the requirements therein stated" (p. 56).
There are other cases which require strict compliance (R.
81). Typical of such cases is Banco Espanolde Credito
v. State Street Bank, 266 F. Supp. 106. In that case the
letter of credit involved required that the draft contain
a certificate "that the goods are in conformity with the
order." The certificate indicated "conforming to the conditions on the stock order sheets." The court held that
this disparity justified the bank in not honoring the draft.
There is no question that Titanium, although familiar
with the use of drafts, did not forward any drafts to Valley Bank and Trust Co. (R. 148). It is also uncontroverted that Valley Bank and Trust Co. did not honor any
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invoices as though they were drafts (R. 166-200), under
the terms of the Letters of Credit of October 8, 1968, and
March 3, 1969 (Exhibits 2 and 3). Instead, Valley Bank
and Trust Co., required in each case, that its customer
supply the money to pay the invoices (R. 168, 184).
A draft is defined by Utah Code Annotated, 70A-3104, as "an order" to pay a certain sum which is signed by
the drawer (Exhibit 18-D). None of the invoices which
were submitted by Titanium contained the signature of
the drawer (Exhibits 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10). The invoices were
directed to Space Metals, Inc. rather than to Valley Bank
and Trust Company. A copy of the invoice, directed to
Space Metals, Inc., was forwarded "C/O Valley Bank and
Trust Company" (R. 34). Titanium's invoice copy is
stamped, "Please Remit to Titanium Metals Corporation
of America . . ." (Exhibit 5 through 10). Even in the
event that this language is determined to be a request
or order to pay, the order could not be deemed to refer
to Valley Bank and Trust Company since the invoice was
directed to Space Metals, Inc.
The Honorable Clark L. Derrick writing for the
Arizona Law Review Volume 12, in 1970 discussed a landmark case, Asociacion de Azucareos de Gutemala v.
United States National Bank of Oregon, 423 F. 2d 638
(9th Cir. 1970), which again held that strict compliance
with the terms of the Letter of Credit was required. The
court in this case noted that if the bank had been lax in
requiring strict compliance before making payment, then
the bank would also have failed to satisfy the require-
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ments of the Letter of Credit, and would have been liable
to its customer or would have been unable to recoup the
funds it expended, from its customer (R. A94). The court
in making this comment was recognizing the importance
of compliance with the terms of a Letter of Credit from
the bank's point of view.
The Utah Code Annotated 70A-5-111 specifically discusses the importance of requiring a draft in a Letter of
Credit.
70A-5-111 "(1) Unless otherwise agreed
the beneficiary by transfering or presenting a
documentary draft or demand for payment warrants to all interested parties that the necessary
conditions of the credit have been complied with.
This is in addition to any warranties arising under chapters 3, 4, 7, and 8."
This provision from the code makes it clear that presentation of a draft is a material condition of the Letter of
Credit, with which the plaintiff was required to comply.
The Court can not treat conditions upon which parties
have agreed lightly, as immaterial, or subject to unintentional relinquishment. In this case there are established
commercial procedures that are important from the standpoint of Valley Bank and Trust Co.'s relationship with
the customers, with third parties, with governmental
agencies, and with its internal activity. For example,
when Valley Bank and Trust Company receives a draft
it is accorded a warranty, under 70A-5-111 Utah Code,
that the goods conform. Valley Bank is clearly entitled
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to this protection which was expressly covered in the
Letters of Credit. There has been no compliance with the
condition of the Letter of Credit therefore Bank has no
liability.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING
AND DECIDING THE CASE ON A THEORY
WHICH WAS NOT PLED NOR REVEALED
TO, NOR DISCUSSED WITH THE PARTIES
UNTIL AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE
TRIAL.
It is clear from the record that waiver was not pled
by plaintiff. There was no evidence offered on waiver.
Significantly, the issue of waiver was not raised or discussed during the trial. At no time did the court reveal
to appellants' counsel that waiver was an issue and thus
afford appellant an opportunity to meet it during the
course of trial. This is a classical example of the error
which resultsvfrom failure to give notice of a theory, and
an opportunity to prepare for it.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in finding waiver. The plaintiff,
Titanium Metals Corporation had the burden of pleading
and proving waiver. Plaintiff did not meet this burden.
The only reference to waiver was at the court's initiation.
The requisite intent to relinquish a right which is the required condition needed to establish a legally sufficient
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waiver, was not shown by plaintiff. A waiver can not be
inferred.
According to the existing statutory and case law
there must be strict compliance with the condition of a
Letter of Credit.
In this case there is not only a failure to strictly comply with the terms of the Letter of Credit, there is complete failure of compliance! The essential requirement
of the Letters of Credit was the forwarding of a draft.
This requirement was of vital importance to the bank as
a protection to insure that it could receive payment from
its customer. The bank is primarily liable on a Letter of
Credit and therefore if a draft had been received the Bank
automatically would have issued its check in payment
therefor under the terms of the Letter of Credit, (R. 201)
and would have immediately taken steps to assure the
repayment of the advance. Since no demand had been
made on the bank it assumed, and had the right to assume,
that Space Metals, Inc. and Titanium had made other
credit arrangements and were not calling wkm the bank
under its Letter of Credit. Therefore the Bank had no
reason to attempt to protect itself by taking additional
action to garner assets of Space Metals, Inc.
The conditions of the agreement were important to
the parties and especially to the bank who in a three
paragraph letter extended a substantial line of credit.
This line of credit was extended to Titanium without consideration from it and the Bank has the right to demand
strict compliance with its credit requirements. The trial
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court should have simply enforced the agreement as it
had been written. Valley Bank and Trust Company decided a draft was important and so they made this requirement an integral part of the Letter of Credit. The
plaintiff, Titanium, failed to comply with this simple requirement and is therefore not entitled to the benefit of
the Bank's credit.
Respectfully submitted,
BIELE, JONES,
MURPHY^HASLAM

\Li^&
Attorneys for
Defendants and Appellants
80 West Broadway, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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